Practice and Procedure by Antoine, Denise et al.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 34 Issue 1 Article 11 
Fall 8-1-1982 
Practice and Procedure 
Denise Antoine 
Cynthia M. Parsons 
Blake A. Martin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Denise Antoine, et. al, Practice and Procedure, 34 S. C. L. Rev. 165 (1982). 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
I. DEFAULT JUDGMENT
A. Excusable Neglect
In South Carolina, a trial court may vacate a default judg-
ment upon finding excusable neglect and a meritorious defense.1
With few exceptions,2 however, the South Carolina Supreme
Court has refused to find excusable neglect when default is at-
tributed to a layperson's failure to forward a summons to his
attorney in a timely manner.3 In Broughton v. Jaffee,4 the su-
preme court upheld a trial court's finding of excusable neglect
on the part of a layperson. This decision reaffirms the court's
adherence to a restrictive view of excusable neglect when consid-
ering a layperson's conduct.
Broughton arose from an automobile accident that resulted
in the initiation of two separate suits against the defendant Jaf-
fee,5 each of which was commenced with the filing of a summons
and complaint with the clerk of court. Although the summons
and complaint for one of the actions were personally served on
1. See, e.g., Stewart v. Floyd, 274 S.C. 437, 265 S.E.2d 254 (1980); Thompson v.
Wilder, 272 S.C. 563, 253 S.E.2d 108 (1979).
2. See notes 15 & 16 and accompanying text infra.
3. See, Stewart v. Floyd, 274 S.C. 437, 265 S.E.2d 254 (1980) (defendant mistook
service of second summons and complaint as identical to first and disregarded it); Com-
mercial Credit Corp. v. Knight, 272 S.C. 435, 248 S.E.2d 589 (1978)(defendant mistook
extension of time to pay debt to include extension of time to answer in action for same);
Little v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 270 S.C. 305, 241 S.E.2d 909 (1978)(defendant for-
warded to counsel a summons and complaint which was subsequently lost in mail, but
failed to confirm receipt by attorney); Pressley v. Summer, 266 S.C. 606, 225 S.E.2d 350
(1976)(defendant-insured unsuccessfully attempted to deliver personally summons and
complaint to insurance agent at military camp); Nicholson v. Mull, 266 S.C. 559, 225
S.E.2d 186 (1976)(defendant did not understand legal import of summons and complaint
and failed to consult counsel until after default was entered); McInery v. Toler, 260 S.C.
382, 196 S.E.2d 122 (1973)(defendant believed he had been mistakenly served because he
had assigned his interest in disputed property to another). See note 14 and accompany-
ing text infra.
4. 275 S.C. 541, 273 S.E.2d 767 (1981).
5. J. Broughton v. Jaffee; V. Broughton v. Jaffee. Record at 1.
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the defendant and were timely answered by him, it is disputed
whether the defendant was simultaneously served with a sum-
mons and complaint in the other action. Upon learning of the
latter action, the defendant immediately entered a special ap-
pearance and filed a motion to dismiss that suit." Although the
trial court had previously issued an ex parte order of default, it
vacated9 the order pursuant to section 15-13-90 of the South
Carolina Code.10 On appeal, the supreme court held that the
trial judge had not abused his discretion because the record sup-
ported a finding of excusable neglect and a meritorious
defense.1"
The court in Broughton found the following evidentiary
support for the trial court's conclusion: (1) the care and atten-
tion defendant had given the companion case; (2) the attention
defendant had given the instant case once aware that it was
pending; and (3) the dispute surrounding the perfection of ser-
vice.12 The court summarily held that the record "amply sup-
6. Id.
7. On June 11, 1979, plaintiff filed an affidavit of personal service of process with
the clerk of court. Id. Exhibit 1. Defendant, however, contested the alleged service by
submitting a personal affidavit and the affidavits of two attorneys, one whom he had
consulted on the same day process was served in the companion case. Id. at 9, 12 & 15.
The trial judge found it "unnecessary" to determine whether service of process was in
fact effected. Id., Exhibit 7 at 2.
8. Id. Exhibit 7 at 2.
9. Id.
10. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-13-90 (1976) states: "The court may, in its discretion and
upon such terms as may be just, allow an answer or reply to be made or other act to be
done after the time limited by this Code or by an order enlarge such time." Compare
with S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-27-130 (1976), which provides in part: "The court may, in its
discretion and upon such terms as may be just, at any time within one year after notice
thereof relieve a party from a judgment, order or other proceeding taken against him
through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. .. ."
Section 15-27-130 specifically addresses the vacating of orders or judgments and
may be more appropriate authority for allowing the defendant in Broughton to answer
since an order of default had already been issued. Section 15-13-90 applies when an or-
der of judgment of default has not yet been entered. The supreme court, however, has
recently determined that the required showing for relief is "precisely the same" under
either statute. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Knight, 272 S.C. 435, 436-37, 248 S.E.2d 589,
590 (1978). The court's use of section 15-13-90 in this case is therefore without practical
significance and illustrates that it no longer recognizes a distinction between the two
statutes.
11. 275 S.C. at 542, 273 S.E.2d at 768. Abuse of discretion is currently defined in
South Carolina as: (1) an error of law; or (2) a factual conclusion without evidentiary
support. Stewart v. Floyd, 274 S.C. at 440, 265 S.E.2d at 255 (1980).
12. 275 S.C. at 542, 273 S.E.2d at 768.
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ported" the decision of the trial court.1 3
As a general rule, the South Carolina Supreme Court recog-
nizes excusable neglect on the part of a layperson 14 only in in-
stances of mitigating legal considerations unrelated to the
layperson's conduct,' 5 such as the service of a summons without
a complaint."6 Broughton is in accord with this restrictive ap-
proach. Although the court appears to have considered impor-
tant the defendant's diligence both after discovering the default
and in litigating the companion case, it found similar indicia of
diligence inadequate to support a finding of excusable neglect in
Thermal Insulation Co. v. Town & Campus, Inc. 17 Conse-
13. Id.
14. The issue of excusable neglect may also arise from an attorney's failure to file a
timely answer on behalf of his client. Cases in which neglect has not been found excuse-
able include: McEachern v. Poston, 273 S.C. 122, 254 S.E.2d 796 (1979), Simon v. Flow-
ers, 231 S.C. 545, 99 S.E.2d 391 (1957)(attorney's involvement in other business and legal
matters); Hodges v. Fanning, 266 S.C. 517, 224 S.E.2d 713 (1976)(mistake by attorney's
personnel while the attorney was on vacation); Gillespie v. Rowe, 275 S.C. 98, 267 S.E.2d
535 (1980)(attorney's failure to obtain an alleged extension of time to answer in writing).
The court has, however, found excusable neglect for an attorney's misconception of
legal procedure. E.g., Lee v. Peek, 240 S.C. 203, 125 S.E.2d 353 (1962); Holliday v. Hol-
liday, 235 S.C. 246, 111 S.E.2d 205 (1959); Jenkins v. Jones, 208 S.C. 421, 38 S.E.2d 255
(1946); Savage v. Cannon, 204 S.C. 473, 30 S.E.2d 70 (1944).
15. Since 1938, the court has found excusable neglect by a layperson in only three
cases in which the summons was served with the complaint and in each instance, it relied
on legal considerations unrelated to the conduct of the layperson. Bledsoe v. Metts, 258
S.C. 500, 189 S.E.2d 291 (1972)(defendant had instituted a separate action against the
plaintiff arising from the same cause of action); Edwards v. Ferguson, 254 S.C. 278, 175
S.E.2d 224 (1970)(defendant-insured was an assigned risk and his failure to inform his
insurance company that process had been served would deprive the insurer of any de-
fense to liability); Ballentine Welding Works v. Peden, 188 S.C. 456, 199 S.E. 693
(1938)(defendant disregarded a summons and complaint alleging a debt which had previ-
ously been litigated and adjudged a forgery).
16. See, e.g., Williams v. Carpenter, 273 S.C. 339, 256 S.E.2d 316 (1979); Thompson
v. Wilder, 272 S.C. 563, 253 S.E.2d 108 (1979); Jolley v. Jolley, 265 S.C. 594, 220 S.E.2d
882 (1975); Crawford v. Murphy, 260 S.C. 411, 196 S.E.2d 503 (1973).
Although a summons may be served without a complaint pursuant to S.C. CODE
ANN. § 15-13-230 (1976), the court has expressed its disfavor with the procedure. See
Thompson v. Wilder, 272 S.C. at 566, 253 S.E.2d at 110 (1979); Jolley v. Jolley, 265 S.C.
at 599, 220 S.E.2d at 884-85 (1975). This disfavor perhaps explains the court's willing-
ness to find excusable neglect in this instance.
17. 271 S.C. 478, 248 S.E.2d 310 (1978). Defendant was simultaneously served with
process in two actions by the same plaintiff and mistakenly assumed that both sets of
papers had been forwarded to counsel. Ten days after default, defendant realized his
mistake and immediately delivered the summons and complaint to his attorney. Al-
though defendant had timely answered in one of the actions and had diligently sought to
vacate the unintended default, the supreme court reversed the trial court's finding of
excusable neglect.
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quently, the decision in Broughton to uphold the trial court's
finding of excusable neglect was probably based on the third
consideration in the case - the dispute surrounding the perfec-
tion of service - rather than on the defendant's showing of
diligence. 8
Broughton does not appear to establish a diminished stan-
dard by which the court will measure a layperson's conduct. 19 To
the contrary, the controlling consideration in the case appears to
have been circumstances beyond the layperson's control. In the
absence of similarly mitigating legal circumstances, Broughton is
unlikely to be useful in convincing South Carolina courts to va-
cate default judgments because of the excusable neglect of
laypersons.
Denise Antoine
B. Notice of Damages-Assessment Hearings
The South Carolina Supreme Court ruled in 1978 that a de-
faulting defendant who subsequently makes an appearance has a
right to limited participation in a hearing on the assessment of
unliquidated and unverified damages.20 This decision reflected
the court's view that a defaulting party, by forfeiting his right to
"otherwise answer or plead to the complaint,"'21 concedes liabil-
18. The court in Broughton, by citing Thermal for the proposition that factual con-
clusions made by trial courts without evidentiary support constitute abuses of discretion,
275 S.C. at 542, 273 S.E.2d at 768, appears to emphasize by contrast the importance of
the third consideration in Broughton, the dispute surrounding service.
19. Subsequent decisions indicate no change in the court's restrictive standard when
considering a layperson's conduct. See, e.g., Craps v. Mercury Constr. Co., 275 S.C. 546,
273 S.E.2d 770 (1981)(no excusable neglect for mistaken date of service of process); Mc-
Call v. A-T-O, Inc., 276 S.C. 143, 276 S.E.2d 529 (1981)(no excusable neglect where cor-
porate personnel mistakenly assumed summons and complaint had been forwarded to
counsel); Renney v. Dobbs House, Inc., 275 S.C. 562, 274 S.E.2d 290 (1981)(no excusable
neglect for defendant's confusion when manner of service differed from prior suits with
same party); Y.C. Ballenger Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Reach-All Sales Co., 276 S.C. 394,
279 S.E.2d 127 (1981)(no excusable neglect for defendant's erroneous impression of time
to file answer). For comparison with federal excusable neglect standards under FED. R.
APP. P. 4(a)(failure to file timely notice of appeal), see generally, Annot., 26 A.L.R. FED
569 (1976).
20. Howard v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 271 S.C. 238, 241, 246 S.E.2d 880, 882 (1978).
21. Id. at 242, 246 S.E.2d at 882 (citing Morgan v. Surinam Lumber Corp., 251 S.C.
61, 160 S.E.2d 191, 193 (1968)).
[Vol. 34
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ity, but not the extent of liability.22 Because the court did not at
that time consider whether defendants are entitled to notice of
damages-assessment hearings, the decision failed to put an end
to excessive awards in default proceedings.23 In 1981, in Lewis v.
Congress of Racial Equality2 and Renney v. Dobbs House,
Inc.,25 the court sought to curb excessive awards by recom-
mending that default claimants give defaulting defendants four
days notice of the time and place of damages-assessment
hearings.2"
In Lewis, the plaintiff brought an action against the Con-
gress of Racial Equality (CORE) for invasion of privacy. After
an unsuccessful attempt to serve process on CORE through the
New York City Sheriff's Department, 28 the .plaintiff served pro-
cess by registered mail.29 CORE received process and knew of
the pending action, 30 but failed to file a timely responsive plead-
ing. The lower court granted the plaintiff a default judgment
and awarded $150,000 actual and $100,000 punitive damages.31
CORE subsequently filed a motion to vacate on the ground that
its default was the result of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect.3 2 When the court refused to vacate the judg-
22. 271 S.C. at 242, 246 S.E.2d at 882. When damages are liquidated or verified, a
defendant is deemed to have conceded the amount of liability. Id. at 242 n.1, 246 S.E.2d
at 882 n.1.
23. See, e.g., Renney v. Dobbs House, Inc., 275 S.C. 562, 274 S.E.2d 290 (1981);
Lewis v. Congress of Racial Equality, 275 S.C. 556, 274 S.E.2d 287 (1981); Southland
Mobile Homes of S.C., Inc. v. Associates Fin. Serv., 274 S.C. 488, 265 S.E.2d 258 (1980);
Petty v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 272 S.C. 282, 251 S.E.2d 735 (1979).
24. 275 S.C. 556, 274 S.E.2d 287 (1981).
25. 275 S.C. 562, 274 S.E.2d 290 (1981).
26. 275 S.C. at 567-68, 274 S.E.2d at 293; 275 S.C. at 561, 274 S.E.2d at 289. The
court stated that this notice should conform with S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-9-960 (1976),
which provides that "[n]otice of a motion or other proceeding before a court or judge,
when personally served, shall be given at least four days before the time appointed there-
fore." 275 S.C. at 567-68, 274 S.E.2d at 293; 275 S.C. at 561, 274 S.E.2d at 289.
27. Record at 4.
28. Neither the opinion nor the record disclosed the reason this service was
unsuccessful.
29. 275 S.C. at 558, 274 S.E.2d at 288. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-806 (1976) provides for
service of process by registered mail.
30. 275 S.C. at 558, 274 S.E.2d at 288.
31. Record at 16.
32. CORE claimed process was lost and never came to the attention of any responsi-
ble member of the organization. Record at 10, 63. CORE made the motion to vacate
judgment pursuant to S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-27-130 (1976), which provides as follows:
The court may, in its discretion and upon such terms as may be just, at
5
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ment, CORE appealed."3
In Renney, the plaintiff sued Dobbs House, Inc., for fraudu-
lant breach of contract and wrongful termination of employ-
ment.3 4 The complaint was served on one of the defendant's em-
ployees at the defendant's place of business.3 When the
defendant failed to appear or file any responsive pleading, the
court referred the matter to a Master for a default hearing.3s
The Master determined that notice to the defendant of the de-
fault hearing was not required. He therefore found the defen-
dant to be in default and concluded that judgment should be
entered against the defendant for $200,000, the full amount re-
quested by the plaintiff.3 " The court confirmed the Master's re-
port in its entirety and entered judgment of $200,000 against the
defendant.38 The defendant's attorney moved to vacate the judg-
ment on the grounds of mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect
and protested that the defendant was neither given notice of a
default hearing nor allowed to contest the amount of damages. 9
Although the trial court vacated the judgment, the plaintiff ap-
any time within one year after notice thereof relieve a party from a judgment,
order or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or excusable neglect and may supply an omission in any proceeding.
And whenever any proceeding taken by a party fails to conform in any respect
to the provisions of this Code the court may, in like manner and upon like
terms, permit an amendment of such proceedings so as to make it conformable
thereto.
33. Record at 91, 92.
34. Record at 3.
35. Process was served on an assistant manager who turned the papers over to the
city manager. The city manager, however, took no action on the papers for almost a
month. 275 S.C. at 564, 274 S.E.2d at 291.
36. Record at 11.
37. Id. at 16-19.
38. Id. at 21.
39. The defendant contended that it had made an appearance sufficient to entitle it
to notice of the hearing on damages pursuant to S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-9-970 (1976), which
provides that "[wihen a defendant shall not have demurred or answered, service of no-
tice or papers in the ordinary proceedings in an action need not be made upon him ...
but shall be made upon him or his attorney if notice of appearance in the action has
been given." The defendant had not made an appearance entitling it to notice since it
had not contacted the plaintiffs prior to the hearing. The supreme court observed, how-
ever, that its decision in the case rendered the issue moot. 275 S.C. at 566, 274 S.E.2d at
292. Defendant alleged that plaintiffs failed to comply with S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-25-10
and 15-25-20 (1976) (proper time requirements for default) and failed to state a cause of
action. Defendant also contended that it was denied due process and equal protection.
Finally, defendant requested a new trial or rule nisi on the ground that the damages
award was excessive. Record at 19-23.
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 11
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol34/iss1/11
19821 PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
pealed, asserting the defective service of process.
In neither Lewis nor Renney was the amount of the dam-
ages award challenged. Nevertheless, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court expressed great concern over a series of decisions
including Lewis and Renney, in which unliquidated damages de-
fault claims yielded large awards.40 The court found the awards
in Lewis and Renney to be "so grossly out of proportion to the
delicts alleged in the complaint[s] '' 41 that it decided on its own
initiative not to allow the awards to stand.42
In support of both decisions, the court noted that because
the law favors a trial on the merits, courts should closely scruti-
nize default judgments to prevent harsh results.43 Furthermore,
a judge or jury's award of damages, even when a defendant is in
default, must be based on a preponderance of the evidence
presented at the damages-assessment hearing.44 Although the
court had held in Howard v. Holiday Inns, Inc.,45 that a default-
ing defendant who subsequently makes an appearance has a
40. In a line of cases decided after Howard v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 271 S.C. 239, 246
S.E.2d 880 (1978), but before Lewis and Renney, the court encountered large default
judgments that were awarded without the defendants' participation in the hearing. In
none of the cases was the defendant notified of the hearing. Southland Mobile Homes of
S.C., Inc. v. Associates Fin. Serv., 274 S.C. 488, 265 S.E.2d 258 (1980); Stewart v. Floyd,
274 S.C. 437, 265 S.E.2d 254 (1980); G.A.R. Leasing, Inc. v. Deforest, 273 S.C. 141, 251
S.E.2d 50 (1979); McEachern v. Poston, 273 S.C. 122, 254 S.E.2d 796 (1979); Thompson
v. Wilder, 272 S.C. 563, 253 S.E.2d 108 (1979); Petty v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 272 S.C. 282,
251 S.E.2d 735 (1979).
The court stated in Lewis that the central problem in default judgments is the right
to defend, but noted that in many cases the proper assessment of damages is also a
concern. The court added that claims for liquidated damages raise few problems because
the amount is a sum certain or is at least susceptible of easy computation. Additionally,
the complaint will alert the defendant to the amount of the claim. 275 S.C. at 560, 274
S.E.2d at 289. The court was primarily concerned in Lewis and Renney with claims for
unliquidated damages.
41. 275 S.C. at 560, 274 S.E.2d at 289. Although this quote appears in Lewis, the
court made a similar statement in Renney. See 275 S.C. at 567, 274 S.E.2d at 292.
42. 275 S.C. at 567, 274 S.E.2d at 292; 275 S.C. at 560, 274 S.E.2d at 289.
43. 275 S.C. at 567, 274 S.E.2d at 292; 275 S.C. at 560, 274 S.E.2d at 289. The court
stated that
.. .[N]o rule.. .set[s] a definite boundary beyond which a court of equity can-
not go as a matter of power, or will not go as a matter policy, in preventing the
enforcement of an unconscionable judgment .... [A] court of equity may look
behind a judgment at law in order to do justice between the parties. ...
275 S.C. at 567, 274 S.E.2d at 293 (quoting 46 AM. JuR. 2D Judgments § 807 (1969)); 275
S.C. at 560-61, 274 S.E.2d at 289.
44. 275 S.C. at 567, 274 S.E.2d at 293; 275 S.C. at 561, 274 S.E.2d at 289.
45. 271 S.C. 238, 246 S.E.2d 880 (1978).
7
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right to limited participation in the damages-assessment hear-
ing,4' the court suggested in both Lewis and Renney that the
protection afforded defaulting defendants by Holiday Inns is in-
sufficient. Referring to "problems growing out of such [damages-
assessment] hearings, 47 the court stated that "hereafter in all
unliquidated damages default hearings, even when no appear-
ance has been made, it is the better practice for claimant's coun-
sel to give to the defending party four days notice, as set out in §
15-9-960 of the Code, of the time and place of the hearing.'
4
The court further stated that when the defendant is not notified,
the trial court should closely scrutinize the damages award to
prevent unwarranted results.'9
46. 271 S.C. at 241-42, 246 S.E.2d at 882.
47. 275 S.C. at 567, 274 S.E.2d at 293; 275 S.C. at 561, 274 S.E.2d at 289.
48. 275 S.C. at 567-68, 274 S.E.2d at 293; 275 S.C. at 561, 274 S.E.2d at 289. The
court observed that a defendant's participation would give the judge and jury a broader
understanding of the amount that should be awarded and would tend to insure a fairer
verdict and judgment. 275 S.C. at 568, 274 S.E.2d at 293; 275 S.C. at 561, 274 S.E.2d at
289.
49. 275 S.C. at 567, 274 S.E.2d at 293; 275 S.C. at 560, 274 S.E.2d at 289-90.
Making some provision for notice of damages-assessment hearings is consistent with
FED. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2), which requires a claimant to give a defaulting defendant three
days notice of the default hearing. The court's recommendation in Lewis and Renney
differs from the federal rule in suggesting that notice be given to a defendant who has
not made an appearance. FED R. Civ. P. 55 requires notice only when a defendant has
made an appearance. See generally 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 55.05[3] (2d ed.
1976); 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2687 (1973). The
law in other jurisdictions is unsettled on the requirement of notice of a damages-assess-
ment hearing. See generally Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 586 (1967 & Supp. 1980). Some courts
have held that notice is not required in the absence of a statute or court rule. See, e.g.,
Cleveland v. Cleveland, 262 Ala. 90, 77 So.2d 343 (1955); Grand Lodge Knights of Pyth-
ias v. Stroud, 107 Fla. 152, 144 So. 324 (1932); Hansman v. Gute, 215 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa
1974). Other courts have held that no notice is required under the applicable state stat-
ute. See, e.g., Weems v. Boilloit, 259 Ark. 611, 535 S.W.2d 817 (1976); Ramey v. Hewitt,
188 A.2d 350 (D.C. 1963)(noting that the same result could not have been reached under
FED, R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)); Acme Fast Freight, Inc. v. Bell, 318 So.2d 212 (Fla. 1975)(citing
Stevenson v. Arnold, 250 So.2d 270 (Fla. 1971) for proposition that neither common law
nor applicable statute required notice); Colucci v. Imperial, 414 Pa. 289, 290 n.1, 200
A.2d 297, 298 n.1 (1964) (noting local rules in other counties required notice); Lacy v.
Levine, 204 Va. 297, 130 S.E.2d 443 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 932 (1963). Finally,
some jurisdictions have held that the applicable statutes require notice. See, e.g., Steven-
son v. Turner, 94 Cal. App. 3d 315, 156 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1979); Higbee v. Ambassador
Taxi, Inc., 369 Mass. 967, 341 N.E.2d 258 (1976); United Salt Corp. v. Grice, - N.M.
-, 628 P.2d 310 (1981). Courts that have not required notice have based their decisions
either on precedent and a desire not to impose rules by judicial fiat or on statutory
construction. Courts that have required notice have based their decisions on construction
of the applicable statutes.
8
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The supreme court in Lewis and Renney urged, but did not
require claimants to give notice of damages-assessment hearings
to defaulting defendants.50 Section 15-9-960 of the South Caro-
lina Code generally requires a party to give at least four days
notice of any proceeding.51 According to that section, however,
no notice is required unless the defending party has demurred,
answered the complaint, or filed notice of appearance in the ac-
tion.5 2 Although the recommendation of notice in Lewis and
Renney, even when a defendant has not answered, demurred, or
filed notice of appearance, may exceed the scope of the statutory
notice requirements, the court probably did not wish to contra-
vene the statute's limited notice provisions by requiring notice
to defaulting defendants. The court stated, however, that when a
defendant is not given the opportunity to participate in a dam-
ages hearing, the judge should closely scrutinize the award. In
addition, the court remanded both cases for a new trial on the
damages issue and required that the defense counsel be given
notice of the hearings.5 3
The supreme court's recommendation of notice in Lewis
and Renney, coupled with the Holiday Inns participation rule,
reflect a balancing of the policies of fairness and efficiency. By
encouraging claimants to give defaulting defendants four days
notice of damages-assessment hearings, the court may have in-
creased the procedural protection afforded victims of default.
Whether the recommendation and close scrutiny of awards will
persuade claimants to give notice remains uncertain. If claim-
ants fail to heed the notice recommendation, it will be left to the
courts or the legislature to mandate four days notice to default-
ing defendants in unliquidated damages default cases.
II. IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION
In McComb v. Tiburon Aircraft, Inc.," the South Carolina
Supreme Court affirmed the exercise of in personam jurisdiction
over a foreign corporation whose only contacts with the state
50. 275 S.C. at 562, 274 S.E.2d 290; 275 S.C. at 556, 274 S.E.2d at 287.
51. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-9-960 (1976).
52. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-9-970 (1976).
53. 275 S.C. at 568, 274 S.E.2d at 293; 275 S.C. at 562, 274 S.E.2d at 290.
54. - S.C. -, 281 S.E.2d 482 (1981).
1982]
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were based on an agency relationship. The court held that the
undisputed facts established a prima facie case upon which to
sustain a finding that agents of the defendant were responsible
for tortious injury to South Carolina residents, thereby subject-
ing the defendants to the jurisdiction of South Carolina courts.5
In October 1979, Tiburon Aircraft, a New Mexico Corpora-
tion, purchased a Douglas DC-4 aircraft in Colorado Springs,
Colorado. On November 5, 1979, Tiburon hired two charter pi-
lots to fly the aircraft from Colorado Springs to Costa Rica
where, upon completion of repairs, it was to be leased to a Costa
Rican Corporation." Although the pilots apparently delivered
the plane as contracted, on November 19th or 20th, the FAA
informed the president of Tiburon Aircraft, Mr. T.K. Edenfield,
Jr., that the aircraft had crashed in South Carolina on a farm
owned by J.T. and Clara Lee McCombs.5 7 Mr. Edenfield then
contacted the repair station in San Jose and was told that the
plane had been stolen on the morning of November 19th. 8
The McCombs, both residents of McCormick County, South
Carolina, commenced action against Tiburon, in the McCormick
County Court of Common Pleas pursuant to the procedure for
service on nonresident operators of aircraft.59 The defendant
55. Id. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 482.
56. Record at 7-8. The plane was to be leased for the pur-pose of flying smoked fish
from San Juan to Miami. Id.
57. The plane, transporting marijuana at the time, was flying low-level to avoid de-
tection, struck some trees, crashed and caught fire. The crash cast the marijuana over
the plaintiffs' land and the resulting rush of people trespassing to retrieve the marijuana
caused damage to the land exceeding that caused by the crash and fire. Both pilots were
killed in the crash. Id. at 4. It was undisputed that the deceased pilots were those hired
by Tiburon to fly the plane to Costa Rica. - S.C. at _, 281 S.E.2d at 482.
58. Record at 8.
59. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-9-390 (1976) provides:
Service of process upon the Director of the South Carolina Aeronautics Com-
mission, as agent of the nonresident operator of any aircraft which has set
down in South Carolina, shall be made by leaving a copy thereof, with a fee of
four dollars, in the hands of the Director or his office and such service shall be
sufficient service upon the nonresident if notice of the service and a copy of the
process are forthwith sent by certified mail by the plaintiff or the Director to
the defendant and the defendant's return receipt and the plaintiff's affidavit of
compliance herewith are appended to the summons or other process and filed
with the summons, complaint and other papers in the cause. The Director shall
keep a record of all processes which shall show the day and hour of service
upon him. When the certified return receipt shall be returned to the Director,
he shall deliver it to the plaintiff on request and keep a record showing the
date of its receipt by him and its delivery to the plaintiff.
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filed a Notice of Special Appearance and moved to quash service
for lack of jurisdiction." The trial court found sufficient allega-
tions to infer that the aircraft was operated by agents of the de-
fendant and that Tiburon was subject to in personam jurisdic-
tion in South Carolina under the theory of respondeat
superior."
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court found that
undisputed facts "made out a prima facie case upon which to
sustain a finding that the plane was being operated by agents of
Tiburon.""z In addition, the court stated that the trial court
properly weighed the veracity of the defendant's hearsay affida-
vit claiming termination of the agency relationship. The court
relied on Moorer v. Underwood 4, which upheld the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over an Illinois defendant because her affi-
davits supporting her motion to quash service failed to disclose
facts sufficient to overcome the plaintiff's verified complaint al-
leging an agency relationship.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Ness asserted that al-
though the facts of the ownership and crash were undisputed
60. Record at 1, 6. Tiburon and the McCombs filed affidavits in support of and
against the motions respectively. The plaintiffs' affidavit contained admissions by the
defendant's attorney that the defendant owned the plane. In addition, the plaintiffs' affi-
davit contained a statement made by Mr. Edenfield to agents of the National Transpor-
tation Safety Board admitting the pilots had been hired by Tiburon to fly the aircraft to
Costa Rica. Id. at 10. By stipulation of counsel, plaintiffs interposed the report of the
National Transportation Safety Board. Id. at 12. The defendant's affidavit contained an
assertion by Mr. Edenfield that he was informed by the FAA repair station in San Jose
that the plane had been stolen. Id. at 8. The court correctly concluded that the defen-
dant's affidavit was hearsay, since the utterances relied on were not made while testify-
ing at a proceeding and were offered to prove the nonexistence of the agency relation.
See Player v. Thompson, 259 S.C. 600, 193 S.E.2d 531 (1972); FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
61. Record at 13.
62. - S.C. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 482.
63. Id.
64. 194 S.C. 73, 9 S.E.2d 29 (1940). In Moorer, the defendant was visiting in Sum-
merville, South Carolina. During her stay, her chauffeur drove her car to a theater and
was involved in a collision resulting in damages to the plaintiff. The defendant moved to
quash service for lack of jurisdiction supported by an affidavit which stated that the use
of her car was unknown and unauthorized. Although Moorer is applicable to McComb by
analogy, there are significant differences. The employer in Moorer was present in the
state at the time of the accident and did not claim that the agency relationship had
terminated nor that the car was stolen, but only that the driver's use of the car was
unauthorized. Id. at 75-76, 9 S.E.2d at 29-30. Thus, the issue in Moorer was more one of
the scope of employment rather than the existence of an agency relationship at the time
of the accident.
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and personal jurisdiction could be exercised under the long-arm
statute, jurisdiction could be exercised only if it did not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.6 5 Justice
Ness further asserted that the failure to show a continuing
agency relationship between the pilots and Tiburon at the time
of the crash resulted in the plaintiffs' failure to carry their bur-
den of establishing minimum contacts and, therefore, the exer-
cise of jurisdiction violated due process."e
In South Carolina, the plaintiff has the burden of establish-
ing that a nonresident defendant has sufficient minimum con-
tacts with the state to justify an exercise of jurisdiction by South
Carolina courts, especially when jurisdiction is challenged. 7 In
this case, minimum contacts sufficient for jurisdiction depended
on the existence of an agency relationship. The majority appar-
ently took the position that once the plaintiffs established that
an agency relationship had existed, they met their burden of
proof of establishing minimum contacts and the burden then
shifted to the defendants to prove termination of the relation-
ship. Because the defendant's proof of termination was based on
a hearsay affidavit, the court concluded that the defendant
failed to sustain its burden. 8 While there appears to be little
state court case law on point, the South Carolina Supreme
Court's decision is consistent with federal common law.69 Under
federal law, the plaintiff's burden of establishing minimum con-
tacts necessary for the assertion of jurisdiction is met by a
threshold prima facie showing that the facts of the case confer
jurisdiction under the state long-arm statute. ° Once the plaintiff
65. - S.C. -, -, 281 S.E.2d 482, 483 (1981)(Ness, J., dissenting)(citing Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)). S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-
803(1)(c)(1976), South Carolina's "long-arm" statute, allows state courts to exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over a nonresident "who acts directly or by an agent as to a cause of
action arising from the person's . . . commission of a tortious act in whole or in part in
this state; .. "
66. - S.C. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 484.
67. See Surinam Lumber v. Surinam Timber Corp., 259 F. Supp. 206 (D.C.S.C.
1966); Yarborough & Co. v. Schoolfield Furniture Indus., 275 S.C. 151, 268 S.E.2d 42
(1980). For a thorough discussion of Yarborough, see Practice and Procedure, Annual
Survey of South Carolina Law, 33 S.C. L. REv. 103 (1981).
68. - S.C. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 482.
69. See generally J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 4.41-1[3] (2d ed. 1981).
70. See, e.g., Edwards v. Ainsworth, 377 F. Supp. 200 (S.D. Iowa 1974); Socialist
Workers Party v. Attorney General of the United States, 375 F. Supp. 318 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
[Vol. 34
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makes the prima facie showing for jurisdiction, the burden shifts
to the defendant to show an absence of minimum contacts. 1
The affidavits filed in support of a motion to quash service are
construed against the proponent.72 Since Tiburon's affidavit did
not provide competent evidence of the theft of the aircraft,
Tiburon failed to meet its burden of showing an absence of
jurisdiction.
73
While the supreme court's holding is reasonable on the facts
in McComb, it is foreseeable that a court may be faced with an
attempt to exercise jurisdiction over foreign corporations or
other nonresidents whose only contact with the state is a tor-
tious act committed by a former servant or agent. Once the
plaintiff meets the threshold burden of showing a previous
agency or master-servant relationship, the defendant will be in
the difficult position of having to produce possibly nonexistent
evidence of termination. Although McComb makes it certain
that a plaintiff need sustain only a minimal burden of proof, the
court leaves open the question of how far the defendant must go
to carry its burden. It is clear, however, that the mere assertion
by a nonresident defendant that the agency relationship has ter-
minated will not be sufficient to defeat personal jurisdiction.
Cynthia M. Parsons
III. CLASS ACTIONS
In General Supplies, Inc. v. Southwire Co.,7 4 the South
Carolina Supreme Court held that the remedy afforded under
the state antitrust statute75 was personal to the injured party.
71. See, e.g., Edwards v. Ainsworth, 377 F. Supp. 200 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
72. See, e.g., Cohan v. Municipal Leasing Systems, 379 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Ill.
1974).
73. At trial, Tiburon will have the opportunity to discharge itself of liability. See
Moorer v. Underwood, 194 S.C. 73, 9 S.E.2d 29 (1940). Even if Tiburon is unable to
produce competent evidence of the theft of the aircraft, it will still have the valid defense
that the pilots were outside their scope of employment, since an employer is liable for
the wrongful acts of an employee only while the employee is acting within the scope of
his employment. Adams v. South Carolina Power Co., 200 S.C. 438, 21 S.E.2d 17 (1942).
74. 276 S.C. 55, 275 S.E.2d 579 (1981).
75. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-3-30 (1976). This statute allows, in pertinent part, a party
injured by any violation of the antitrust provision to recover damages "in any court of
competent jurisdiction in this State, from any person operating such trust or combina-
tion, the full consideration or sum paid by him for any goods, wares, merchandise or
1982]
13
Antoine et al.: Practice and Procedure
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Thus, a suit claiming a violation of the antitrust statute could
not be properly maintained under the South Carolina class ac-
tion statute.76 Since General Supplies is the first case in which
the court has dealt with the relationship between these two stat-
utes, this decision is important in that it precludes the class ac-
tion as a vehicle for antitrust violations. 7
Alleging that pricing and discounting disclosures made
among four suppliers of copper building wire in South Carolina
affected full and free competition in prices of wire shipped into
South Carolina during a four-year period, General Supplies, a
direct purchaser of wire from defendant Southwire, brought an
antitrust suit on behalf of itself and all others who were direct or
indirect purchasers of the wire during the time in question. Ini-
tially, all four defendants demurred to the complaint claiming,
inter alia, that it could not be brought as a class action. General
Supplies amended its complaint by limiting the class to direct
purchasers only, expressing an intent to create a common fund,
and alleging the existence of common questions of law and fact.
Nevertheless, the trial court sustained the defendants' demur-
rers to the amended complaint."
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court read the an-
titrust statute in an extremely literal fashion and held that the
remedy afforded was personal to the injured party.79 The court
relied on Newberry Mills, Inc. v. Dawkins"0 and Wilder v. South
Carolina State Highway Department"1 as support for the gen-
eral rule that actions at law for monetary damages may not be
brought as class actions. Therefore, since an antitrust suit is an
action for monetary damages, General Supplies could not prop-
erly maintain the suit as a class action.
2
articles the sale of which is controlled by such combination or trust."
76. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-5-50 (1976).
77. 276 S.C. at 58, 275 S.E.2d at 580.
78. Id. The defendant cited both the lack of a common recovery and of a prior legal
or organizational bond among the class members.
79. Id. See supra note 75. The court construed the language in section 39-3-30,
.paid by him . . .", to effectively preclude a class action under this statute.
80. 259 S.C. 7, 190 S.E.2d 503 (1972)(action brought to recover taxes paid under
protest was an action at law for monetary damages and hence could not be properly
maintained as a class action).
81. 228 S.C. 448, 90 S.E.2d 635 (1955)(class action inappropriate in an action to
recover postage charges for license plates picked up directly by the plaintiff and others).
82. 276 S.C. at 58, 275 S.E.2d at 581.
[Vol. 34
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Prior to General Supplies, however, precedent existed
which would have allowed the court to uphold the suit as a class
action. Specifically, in Knowles v. Standard Savings and Loan
Association,83 the plaintiff assumed a mortgage with the defen-
dant upon the purchase of certain real estate. The cause of ac-
tion arose as a result of the defendant's practice of charging one
percent of the loan balance in addition to the nine percent per
annum interest rate which the mortgage loans bore. The plaintiff
brought a class action to recover the excessive amounts assessed
against him and all similarly situated parties who had assumed a
mortgage loan with the defendant.8
In upholding.the maintenance of the suit as a class action,
the court formulated a five-part test against which it measured
the allegations in the complaint. First, the rights of the individ-
ual plaintiff and the class must entail common questions of law
and fact. Second, the claims of the plaintiff must be typical of
the claims of the class. Third, all members of the class must
have a right to a common remedy. Fourth, the members of the
class must be so numerous as to render it impracticable to bring
them all before the court. Last, it must be shown that the indi-
vidual plaintiff's action will adequately represent all members of
the class.8 5
If the court had applied the Knowles test to the facts in
General Supplies, each of the five requirements would have
been satisfied. First, the rights of General Supplies and other
class members clearly involved common questions of law and
fact, since recovery was contingent on General Supplies' ability
to prove that the pricing and discounting disclosures made
among the defendants were in violation of the antitrust stat-
ute."8 Second, the claim advanced by General Supplies, that it
was damaged by having to pay increased costs for copper build-
ing wire because of the price-fixing activities of the defendants,
83. 271 S.C. 217, 246 S.E.2d 879 (1978).
84. Id. at 219, 246 S.E.2d at 879.
85. Id. at 219, 246 S.E.2d at 879-80.
86. Although each class member may have sought a different amount in General
Supplies, it should have been of little consequence since the same situation existed in
Knowles. Furthermore, even though an argument could be made that in Knowles only a
simple mathematical computation was required to determine damages, while General
Supplies would have involved a more complex method, mere administrative convenience
should not be used to preclude appropriate relief where it is due.
1982]
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was typical of the claims of other class members.8 7 Third, in
seeking the recovery of surcharges, General Supplies gave class
members a right to a common remedy, and would have been ef-
fective and appropriate to the entire class, as well as dispositive
of the rights of each class member. Fourth, the members of the
class involved, numbering over 1,000,88 were clearly so numerous
as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court.
Last, there was no indication that General Supplies would not
have adequately represented all members of the class. Indeed,
General Supplies' desire to establish the existence of a violation
and recover the excesses paid would have made it a zealous rep-
resentative of each class member's interests.
Nevertheless, the supreme court failed to apply or even ac-
knowledge the Knowles test in General Supplies. By eliminating
the availability of class actions in antitrust suits, the court's
holding in General Supplies places South Carolina in opposition
to the federal courts, which generally allow class actions under
the federal antitrust statute.89 The court's holding may be ex-
plained as an attempt to maintain harmony with the express leg-
islative prohibition of class actions under the South Carolina
Unfair Trade Practices Act.90 In any event, the court's decision
in General Supplies reduces the likelihood that those who have
been harmed by antitrust violations will be able to bring suit
unless their claims are sufficiently large to bear the risk of ex-
pensive litigation.
IV. NEW TRIAL ALLOWED ON A SINGLE ISSUE
Since 1958, the South Carolina Supreme Court has refused
to allow an individual issue in a multiple issue action to be the
subject of a new trial.9 1 In 1981, however, in Industrial Welding
87. Although factual variations may have existed between how General Supplies was
damaged and how other class members were individually damaged, nothing in the court's
opinion indicates that the claims of class members would, in any material respect, differ
from that advanced by General Supplies.
88. Record at 17.
89. See, e.g., In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 82 F.R.D. 143 (Pa. 1979); In re Cor-
rugated Container Antitrust Litig., 80 F.R.D. 244 (Tex. 1978); In re Plywood Antitrust
Litig., 76 F.R.D. 570 (La. 1976).
90. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140 (1976).
91. See South Carolina Electric & Gas v. Aetna Ins. Co., 233 S.C. 557, 106 S.E.2d
276 (1958).
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Supplies v. Atlas Vending,92 the court reconsidered its position
and, recognizing the severability of multiple issues in a single
trial, ruled that a new trial may be granted on a single issue
without necessarily being deemed a new trial on all issues.93 The
decision aligns South Carolina with the approved practice in
most American jurisdictions. 4
Appellant, Industrial Welding Supplies, contracted with re-
spondent, Atlas Vending, to provide full carbon dioxide cylin-
ders for use in the respondent's business. The respondent agreed
to return the empty cylinders in exchange for more full ones.
When the respondent discontinued the appellant's services, it
refused to return the empty cylinders and the appellant brought
an action to recover possession of the cylinders or their value.
Although the appellant prevailed at trial on the issue of liability,
it moved for a new trial on several issues, including the proper
measure of damages. The trial judge denied the motion. 5 On ap-
peal, the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that the respon-
dent was entitled to a new trial on the measure of damages, but
limited the trial to that single issueY6
In adopting the rule that a new trial may be limited to a
single issue, the supreme court partially overturned South Caro-
92. 276 S.C. 196, 277 S.E.2d 885 (1981).
93. Id. at 201, 277 S.E.2d at 887.
94. See, e.g., Slavenburg v. Bautts, 221 Kan. 590, 595, 561 P.2d 423, 428
(1977)("Since the issue of liability has been litigated and decided by the jury the new
trial should be limited to the issue of damages"); Messick v. City of Hickory, 211 N.C.
531, 191 S.E. 43, (1937)(court will generally grant partial new trial when reason for doing
so is confined to one issue entirely separable from others); Fields v. Volkswagen of
America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48, (Okla. 1976) (allowing new trial on damages issue only when it
is clear that error did not affect entire verdict); Richmond v. Campbell, 148 W. Va. 595,
136 S.E.2d 877 (1964) (verdict may be set aside and new trial may be granted on single
issue of damages). See generally Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 1199 (1953).
95. The fact summary presented considerably simplifies a complicated procedural
history, the details of which are unnecessary for the purposes of this survey. Neverthe-
less, it should be noted that the decision considered here is the second appeal of the case.
Appellant first appealed successfully a ruling that its action was barred by the applicable
statute of limitations. See Industrial Welding Supplies, Inc. v. Atlas Vending Co., 272
S.C. 293, 251 S.E.2d 741 (1978). Moreover, the propriety of a new trial on the sole issue
of damages was not the only issue in the second appeal. Appellant also successfully chal-
lenged the trial court's refusal to allow amendment of its complaint and the court's rul-
ing that appellant had the burden of proof and duty of mitigation at trial. For greater
detail, see 276 S.C. at 198-200, 277 S.E.2d at 886-87.
96. 276 S.C. at 201, 277 S.E.2d at 887.
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lina Electric & Gas v. Aetna Insurance Co.,e  a 1958 decision in
which the court concluded that a new trial on a single issue is
never proper."8 In that case, the lower court had granted a new
trial solely on the issue of damages after the jury had returned a
verdict establishing the insurer's liability to the insured under a
fire insurance policy. The South Carolina Supreme Court re-
versed, however, and stated that a new trial on a single issue "is
not countenanced in the modern decisions of this court."' 9 The
court concluded that it would therefore be inappropriate to
grant a new trial on the issue of damages alone. 100 Although the
court in Industrial Welding stated that the decision in South
Carolina Electric & Gas was correct on its facts, it concluded
without explanation that the apparent adoption of an absolute
prohibition of a new trial on a single issue was unwarranted by
and contrary to the earlier South Carolina case upon which the
court had relied.10 1 The court, therefore, overruled that portion
of South Carolina Electric & Gas which held that a new trial on
a single issue must necessarily be deemed a new trial on all
issues.1°2
Industrial Welding has established a three-part standard
for determining when a new trial may be granted on a single
97. 233 S.C. 557, 106 S.E.2d 276 (1958).
98. Id. at 560-61, 106 S.E.2d at 277.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 276 S.C. at 201, 277 S.E.2d at 887. The court in South Carolina Electric & Gas
v. Aetna Ins. Co. cited Southern Ry. v. Madden, 224 F.2d 320 (4th Cir. 1955); Southern
Ry. v. Neese, 216 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1954); and Nelson v. Charleston & Western Carolina
Co. Ry. 231 S.C. 351, 98 S.E.2d 798 (1957). In Neese, however, the Fourth Circuit re-
versed the lower court for failing to set aside a damages verdict and remanded the case
for a new trial confined to the damages issue. 216 F.2d at 776. In Madden, the Fourth
Circuit refused to allow a new trial solely on the issue of damages because to do so would
have unjustly harmed the party against whom the issue of liability was resolved. The
court distinguished Neese on the ground that in that case injustice would not have re-
sulted from a new trial on the issue of damages only. However, the Neese court did not
absolutely prohibit new trials on single issues. 224 F.2d at 321. In Nelson, the South
Carolina Supreme Court reversed a judgment for excessive damages and remanded for a
new trial without discussing single issue new trials. 231 S.C. at 363, 98 S.E.2d at 803.
102. 276 S.C. at 201, 277 S.E.2d at 887. The court briefly referred to the history of
the prohibition of new trials limited to a single issue, noting that English common law
courts forbade the practice because the verdict was deemed "a single and inextricable
whole." Id. The court further observed, however, that the English practice ended with
the Judicature Act and that a new trial upon a single issue is accepted procedure in most
American jurisdictions. Id.
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issue. A new trial on a single issue is appropriate only when (1)
distinct jury issues are involved, (2) the issue for which a new
trial is desired is separate from all other issues, and (3) the error
requiring a new trial does not affect the determination of any
other issue.10 3 The court in Industrial Welding, noting with par-
ticularity that the respondent's liability had been conclusively
determined, found the test satisfied and held it proper that the
case be remanded for a new trial on the sole issue of damages.
10'
The court's decision in Industrial Welding is significant in
two important respects. First, the new rule should better pro-
mote judicial economy by allowing the courts to hear on retrial
only those issues left unresolved after appeal, rather than those
issues for which the lower court's judgment has been affirmed.
Second, allowing new trials on single issues spares the parties
the time and expense of an entire trial when only one issue re-
mains undetermined. The court's qualified overruling of South
Carolina Electric & Gas reveals, however, that not every case is
appropriate for retrial on a single issue, even when that issue is
the proper measure of damages. Rather, in each case the moving
party must demonstrate that a new trial on a single issue is ap-
propriate under the Industrial Welding standard.
Blake A. Martin
103. Id. at 201, 277 S.E.2d at 887.
104. Id.
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